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15.11.12

Merkiavel

Angelika Merkel Angela Merkel, originally uploaded by julianmilo.

Angela Merkel este Merkiavel - Machiavelli al zilelor noastre




Sunt numeroşi cei ce văd în Angela Merkel, actualul cancelar al Germaniei, regina fără coroană a Europei, scrie ziarul parizian „Le Monde” într-un amplu studiu consacrat acesteia şi semnat de sociologul şi filosoful german Ulrich Beck. Autorul începe prin a spune că atunci „când se pune problema să ştii de unde îşi trage puterea Angela Merkel eşti trimis la una dintre caracteristicile ce definesc felul său de a face ceva: o abilitate machiavelică. Potrivit lui Niccolo Machiavelli (1467-1529), primul gânditor ce s-a aplecat asupra naturii puterii, Principele nu trebuie să-şi ţină cuvântul dat ieri decât dacă acesta îi poate aduce avantaje. Dacă se transpune această maximă la situaţia de azi, acest lucru înseamnă că este posibil să se facă azi contrariul a ceea ce s-a anunţat ieri dacă acest lucru măreşte şansele de a câştiga viitoarele alegeri. Afinităţile politice între Merkel şi Machiavelli - faimosul model Merkiavel, cum îl numesc eu - constau en gros în patru factori destinaţi să se completeze unul pe celălalt.

1. Germania este ţara cea mai bogată şi economic cea mai puternică din Uniunea Europeană. În actualul context de criză financiară, toate ţările îndatorate depind de bunăvoinţa germanilor, gata să se facă garanţi ai creditelor necesare. Machiavelismul cancelarei ţine de faptul că, în conflictul virulent care opune arhitecţii Europei şi „suveranişti”, ea ţine să ia parte, sau, mai curând, rămâne deschisă ambelor opţiuni. Ea nu este solidară europenilor (nici în Germania, nici în străinătate) care cer în cor şi tare garanţii germane şi nici nu susţine fracţiunea euroscepticilor care se opun oricărui ajutor. Angela Merkel preferă să facă să depindă dispoziţia Germaniei de a acorda credite ţărilor îndatorate să accepte condiţiile politicii germane de stabilitate - şi este aici tot o ironie machiavelică a poziţiei sale. Este primul principiu al lui Machiavelli: când este vorba să ajuţi ţările îndatorate cu bani germani, poziţia Angelei Merkel nu este nici un DA sincer, nici un NU categoric, ci un răspuns incert.

2. Cum este posibil să impui această poziţie paradoxală în practica politică? La Machiavelli, era de ajuns în acest sens să faci dovadă de virtute, amestec de energie politică şi de combativitate Aici noi punem degetul pe o altă formă de ironie: puterea lui Merkiavel constă în fapt în dorinţa de a nu face nimic, pe ideea de a nu acţiona încă, a acţiona mai târziu, a ezita. Această artă a tergiversării selective, acest amestec de indiferenţă, de refuz al Europei şi de angajament europen este la originea poziţiei de forţă a Germaniei într-o Europă zguduită de criză. Desigur, există mai multe motive care conduc la ezitare - situaţia mondială este atât de complexă încât nimeni nu este capabil să se descurce; nu există adesea posibilitatea unei alegeri între alternative ale căror riscuri nu pot fi măsurate. Dar aceste motive justifică în acelaşi timp politica tărăgănării ca strategie a puterii. Angela Merkel a dus la perfecţiune forma de suveranitate involuntară legitimată de credoul austerităţii. Noua putere germană în Europa nu are la bază, deci, cum a fost cazul în trecut, violenţa ca „ultima ratio”. Ea nu are nevoie să recurgă la nicio armă pentru a-şi impune voinţa altor state. Iată de ce este absurd să se vorbească despre „al IV-lea Reich”. Noua putere bazată pe economie este mult mai suplă şi mai mobilă: ea este prezentă peste tot, fără a fi necesar să recurgă la trupe.

3. În acest fel se poate realiza ceea ce apare drept cvadratura cercului: reunirea într-o singură persoană a capacităţii de a fi reales în propria ţară şi de a trece, totodată, drept arhitect al Europei. Dar acest lucru înseamnă că toate măsurile necesare salvării euro şi UE trebuie să reuşească mai întâi să treacă testul în interiorul frontierelor germane - pentru a şti dacă ele sunt propice intereselor Germaniei şi poziţiilor de forţă ale Angelei Merkel. Cu cât germanii devin mai critici faţă de Europa, cu atât ei se simt înconjuraţi de ţări cu debitori care nu-şi doresc decât accesul la banii germanilor, şi va fi greu de menţinut această mare distanţă. Merkiavel a răspuns la această problemă scoţând cartea sa „Europa Germană”, care este un adevărat atu atât pe plan intern, cât şi în exteriorul frontierelor germane. Pe plan intern, cancelara dă asigurări germanilor, care se tem pentru pensiile lor şi pentru miracolul economic şi apără cu putere orice protest al politicii lui NU bine dozat, profilându-se în acelaşi timp ca o profesoară, singura capabilă să dea lecţii Europei. În acelaşi timp, în afacerile europene, ea concepe „responsabilitatea sa europeană”, integrând ţările europene într-o politică a celui mai mic rău. Oferta ei, care are şi valoare de momeală, se rezumă în această formulă: e mai bine ca euro să fie german decât să nu fie euro deloc. În acest sens, Merkel continuă să se arate ca o foarte bună elevă a lui Machiavelli. „E mai bine să fii iubit decât temut?”, se întreba acesta în „Principele”. „Răspunsul este că trebuie şi unul, şi celălalt, dar cum e dificil să le acordezi pe cele două, este mai sigur să fii temut decât iubit, dacă trebuie să te dispensezi de unul dintre cele două lucruri”. Cancelara germană recurge la acest principiu de manieră selectivă: ea vrea să fie temută în străinătate şi iubită în ţara ei - poate, pe bună dreptate, pentru că a învăţat alte ţări să se teamă. Neoliberalism brutal în exterior, consens acoperit de social-democraţie în interior: aceasta este formula care i-a permis lui Merkiavel să-şi consolideze poziţia de forţă şi cea a Europei germane.

4. Merkel vrea să prescrie şi chiar să impună partenerilor săi ceea ce trece drept o formulă magică în Germania la nivel economic şi politic. Imperativul german este următorul: Economisiţi! Economisiţi în favoarea stabilităţii. Dar, în realitate, această politică de economie arată că ea este mai curând sinonimă tăierilor clare la nivelul pensiilor, formării, cercetării, infrastructurilor etc. Avem de-a face cu un neoliberalism de o extremă violenţă, care va trebui integrat în Constituţia Europeană sub forma unui pact bugetar - fără a face caz de opinia publică europeană (prea slabă pentru a rezista). Aceste patru componente ale merkiavelismului - legătura dintre suveranitate şi leadership-ul construcţiei europene, arta tergiversării ca strategie de punere la pas, primatul acordat scadenţelor electorale şi, în fine, cultura germană a stabilităţii - se confortează unele pe altele şi constituie nucleul dur al Europei germane. Şi găsim chiar la Merkel o paralelă cu ceea ce Machiavelli numeşte „necessita”, această situaţie de urgenţă în faţa căreia Prinţul trebuie să fie capabil să reacţioneze: Germania ca un „amabil hegemon”, poziţie atât de lăudată de Thomas Schmid, director al cotidianului „Die Welt”, se vede constrânsă să aşeze ceea ce rezultă dintr-un pericol deasupra a ceea ce este interzis de legi. Pentru a extinde la toată Europa, şi de o manieră constrângătoare, politica de austeritate a Germaniei, normele democratice pot, potrivit lui Merkiavel, să fie flexibilizate sau chiar deformate. E adevărat, se asistă azi la emergenţa unui front de opoziţie constituit de toţi cei care cred că avansul rapid al europenizării pune în pericol drepturile Parlamentului german şi că este contrar legii fundamentale, echivalentul Constituţirei. Dar, abilă în manevre, Merkel reuşeşte să instrumentalizeze aceste bastioane ale rezistenţei integrându-le în politica sa de domesticire prin tărăgănare. O dată în plus, ea câştigă pe două fronturi: mai întâi putere în Europa şi, totodată, popularitate în interior, culegând favorurile alegătorilor germani. S-ar putea ca metoda Merkel să-şi atingă limitele puţin câte puţin, căci trebuie recunoscut că politica germană de austeritate nu a înregistrat niciun succes pentru moment. Dimpotrivă: criza îndatorării ameninţă acum şi Spania, Italia şi, poate curând, şi Franţa. Săracii devin tot mai săraci, clasele mijlocii sunt ameninţate cu declasarea şi încă nu se vede capătul tunelului. În acest caz, puterea ar putea conduce la emergenţa unei contra-puteri, cu atât mai mult cu cât Merkel a pierdut unul dintre cei mai solizi aliaţi în persoana lui Nicolas Sarkozy. După ce Hollande a preluat puterea, echilibrele s-au schimbat. Reprezentanţii ţărilor îndatorate ar putea să se regrupeze cu promotorii Europei la Bruxelles şi la Frankfurt pentru a pune pe picioare o alternativă la politica de austeritate a cancelarei germane, adesea foarte populistă şi axată mai ales doar pe interesele germane şi motivată de teama de inflaţie, şi să regândească astfel funcţia BCE pentru ca ea să se caleze în principal pe politica de creştere a Băncii Centrale Americane. Un alt scenariu este de asemenea posibil: s-ar putea asista la un duel între Angela Merkiavel, europeana ezitantă, şi Peer Steinbruck, candidatul SPD la postul de cancelar în 2013, un pasionat de şah, care şi-a descoperit o vocaţie de Willy Brandt pe plan european. Dacă formula câştigătoare a acestuia din urmă era „schimbare prin apropiere” (între Est şi Vest), formula lui Steinbruck ar putea fi: mai multă libertate, mai multă securitate socială şi mai multă democraţie - prin intermediul Europei. Am putea asista atunci la o supralicitare a celor doi proeuropeni. Fie Peer Steinbruck ajunge s-o facă mat pe Merkiavel la nivel european; fie Merkiavel câştigă întrucât a descoperit importanţa strategică a ideii europene şi se va converti în fondatoare a Statelor Unite ale Europei. Într-un fel sau în altul, Germania se confruntă cu marea problemă a Europei: a fi sau a nu fi. Ea a devenit prea puternică pentru a putea să plătească luxul de a nu lua decizii”.

În încheiere, trebuie semnalat că autorul studiului din „Le Monde” - Ulrich Beck - a scris şi foarte importante volume pe această temă - „Europa germană”, de pildă - şi că predă economia la London School of Economist şi la Harvard - SUA.

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Hesitation as a means of coercion – that is Merkiavelli’s method. Only one fate is worse than being overwhelmed
by German money and that is not being
overwhelmed by German money. Power grounded in the economy has no need to
invade and yet is ubiquitous.


The German Chancellor Angela Merkel is widely regarded as the uncrowned
queen of Europe. If we inquire into the basis of her power we become aware of
one characteristic feature of her effectiveness: her characteristic quality is
a tactical adroitness that might well be deemed Machiavellian. The Prince,
Machiavelli believed, must only stick to what he said yesterday if it brings
him positive advantages today. Transferring this to the present situation would
produce the maxim: today you can do the opposite of what you proclaimed
yesterday, if it improves your own chances in the next election.

Thus Merkel fought long and hard to extend the working lives of the
German nuclear power stations while calmly accepting a possible exit from
Europe. Following the catastrophe at the Fukushima reactor she did an about
face and approved an end to nuclear energy and a new commitment to Europe. Since
then she has showed herself to be a master of ‘last-minute rescues’. Yesterday
she said: ‘Eurobonds? Over my dead body!’ Today she instructs finance minister
Wolfgang Schäuble to look for a way out of or around the financial crisis that
includes tolerating direct credits from the ECB to participating banks and
states, credits that in the last analysis have to be paid for in part by the
German taxpayer.


Demotix/Reynaldo C. Paganelli [14]. All rights reserved.



The Merkiavelli model


The political affinity between Merkel and Machiavelli – which I think of
as the Merkiavelli model – is based on four mutually complementary components.

First, Germany is the strongest and wealthiest economy in the EU. Because of
the credit crunch, all the debtor nations depend on Germany’s willingness to
act as guarantor for the necessary credits. All this is trivial in power terms
and tells us nothing about Merkel’s Machiavellian politics. The latter arise from
the fact that Merkel has positioned herself between the Europe builders and the
orthodox adherents of the nation state without
taking either side – or rather, she keeps both options open. She neither
identifies with the pro-Europeans (whether at home or abroad) who call for
binding German commitments, nor does she support the Eurosceptics, who wish to
refuse all assistance. Instead, and this is the Merkiavellian point, Merkel
links German willingness to provide credit with the willingness of the debtor nations
to satisfy the conditions of German stability policies. This is Merkiavelli’s
first principle: on the subject of German money to assist the debtor nations,
her position is neither a clear Yes or a clear No but a clear Yes and No.

Second, how can this paradoxical stance be translated into practice? At this
point, Machiavelli would have called for virtù,
i.e. prowess, political energy and the thirst for action. But here we come to a
second point. Merkiavelli’s power is founded on her circumspection, the desire
to do nothing. This art of deliberate
hesitation, a combination of indifference, the rejection of Europe and the
commitment to Europe, is at the root of the German stance in a crisis-ridden
Europe.

Hesitation as a means of coercion – that is Merkiavelli’s method. This
coercion is not the aggressive incursion of German money but the opposite. It
is the threat of withdrawal, delay and the refusal of credit. If Germany
withholds its consent, the ruin of the debtor nations is inevitable. Only one
fate is worse than being overwhelmed by German money and that is not being overwhelmed by German money.

Of course there are many reasons to hesitate: the contemporary world is
so complex that nobody can grasp it; often, the only choice left is the one
between incalculably risky alternatives. Yet, at the same time, these reasons
justify hesitation as a strategy of power. This type of involuntary domination,
legitimated as it is by a hymn to austerity, has been perfected by Angela
Merkel. The European landscape of power is now being transformed by the epitome
of unpolitical activity, i.e. doing nothing at all. By this means Germany’s
rise to the position of hegemonic power in Europe has been both advanced and
concealed. That is the tactic of which Merkel is
the master and which might indeed have come straight out of Machiavelli.

Thus the new German power in Europe is not based as in former times on
force as the ultima ratio. It has no
need of weapons to impose its will on other states. If only for this reason,
all talk of the ‘Fourth Reich’ is absurd. Furthermore, power that is grounded
in the economy is far more mobile. It has no need to invade and yet is
ubiquitous.

The domestic politics litmus
test


Third, this is how Germany has succeeded in the seemingly impossible task of
combining national electability and its role as Europe builder. But that also
means that all measures designed to save the euro and the European Union must
begin by passing the test of proving their suitability for domestic politics,
i.e. of satisfying the question whether they will promote German interests and
Merkel’s own position. The more critical of Europe the Germans become, the more
they feel beleaguered by debtor nations who want nothing better than to make
free with the money in German pockets, the harder it will become to disentangle
the mess.


Demotix/Gonçalo Silva [15]. All rights reserved.

Merkiavelli has now responded to this problem by producing her trump
card – the idea of a German Europe. Domestically, the Chancellor soothes the
Germans who are in a rising panic about their pensions, their houses and their
economic miracle by donning a mien of Protestant severity and administering
doses of ‘No’s’ at regular intervals. By adopting such a policy she has
advanced to the position of Europe’s schoolmistress. At the same time, in foreign
affairs she adopts a stance of ‘European responsibility’ by obtaining the
support of the Eurozone nations through a policy of the lesser evil. Her siren
call is: better a German euro than no euro at all.

In this sense too Merkel has proved to be an astute disciple of
Machiavelli. Is it better to be ‘loved or feared?’ he had inquired in The Prince. His answer is that ‘one
ought to be both feared and loved, but as it is difficult for the two to go
together, it is much safer to be feared than loved, if one of the two has to be
wanting’.[1]
Angela Merkel may be said to apply this principle selectively. Abroad she is to
be feared, at home she should be loved – perhaps because she has taught foreign
countries to fear. Brutal neo-liberalism to the outside world, consensus with a
social-democratic tinge at home – that is the successful formula which has
enabled Merkel consistently to expand her own position of power and that of
Germany as well.

Fiscal Compact, necessità and occasione


Fourth, Merkel wants to prescribe what actions should be taken by Germany’s
partners and even stipulate that they should adopt what passes in Germany for
the magic formula for politics and the economy. The German mantra runs: save,
save in the interests of stability. The political reality is unmasked as the
good housekeeping practices of the famous or notorious ‘Swabian housewife’. However,
these tend to turn quickly into radical cuts in the resources available for
pensions, education, research, infrastructure, etc. We are faced here with a
hardnosed neo-liberalism that is now to be built into the European constitution
in the shape of the Fiscal Compact – bypassing the (feeble) European public
sphere in the process.

These then are the four components of Merkiavellism – the combination of
nation-state orthodoxy and Europe-building, the art of hesitation as a means of
coercion, the primacy of national electability
and lastly the German culture of stability. They mutually reinforce one another
and constitute the core of the power at the heart of a German Europe. There is
even a parallel for Machiavelli’s necessità,
the historical emergency to which the Prince must be able to respond. This is
the idea of Germany as what Thomas Schmid (editor of the newspaper Die Welt) calls the ‘good-natured hegemon, [16]’ who finds him/herself compelled to put the need to deal with imminent
danger above the fact that certain actions are forbidden by law. In order to
extend German austerity policies throughout Europe as a whole, democratic norms
may have to be relaxed or subverted according to Merkiavelli.

At the same time, we perceive once again that Germany’s rise to the
position of the leading power in ‘the German Europe’ is not the consequence of
a secret master plan, cunningly conceived and adroitly executed. At least to
begin with, it was the involuntary and unplanned product of the financial
crisis and its anticipation of disaster. As matters progressed, we may suspect
from the way in which they developed that a more conscious element of planning
did enter into it. The Chancellor saw the crisis as her occasione, ‘the propitious moment’. A combination of fortuna and Merkiavellian virtù enabled her to seize the historic
opportunity and profit from it both domestically and in foreign relations. Admittedly,
something of an internal opposition is building, consisting of those who take
the view that the rapid process of Europeanization disregards the rights of the
German parliament and is therefore incompatible with the Basic Law. But Merkel
has cleverly managed to turn even these bastions of resistance to her own
advantage by integrating them into her policy of taming the opposition by means
of her delaying tactics. Once again she is doubly successful; she has achieved
more power in Europe and greater popularity at home, enjoying the favour of the
German voter.

To be or not to be


The Merkiavelli method may well gradually reach its own limits. After all,
the German policy of austerity has yet to show any successes – quite the
contrary, in fact. The debt crisis now threatens to engulf Spain, Italy and
perhaps even France. The poor are becoming even poorer, the middle classes are
threatened with decline and up to now there has been no light at the end of the
tunnel. In this case too, then, power may well lead to the formation of a
countervailing-force, especially now that with Nicolas Sarkozy’s departure,
Angela Merkel has lost an important ally. The arrival of his successor François
Hollande has brought a noticeable shift in the balance of power.
Representatives of the debtor nations have been able to convene meetings with
the Europe builders in Brussels and Frankfurt in order to find an alternative
to the frequently populist austerity policies of Angela Merkel (and also
Philipp Rösler, the Free-Democrat Minister of Economics and Technology), which
are so clearly aimed at the German electorate with its ingrained fear of
inflation. These meetings are designed to rethink the function of the ECB and
persuade it to direct its efforts towards a policy of growth along the lines of
the stance adopted by the US Federal Reserve.

But there is also the possibility of another scenario, namely that of a
duel between Angela Merkiavelli,
the hesitating European, and the Social
Democratic chancellor candidate Peer Steinbrück [17], the passionate ‘checkmate player’, who
discovers his role as a European Willy Brandt [18]
(Former German Chancellor and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 1971). While Brandt’s
formula for success was ‘change through rapprochement’, Steinbrück’s could be:
more freedom, more social security, and more democracy – through Europe. If
that was the case we might (contrary to our expectations) see a competition
between two pro-Europeans trying to outbid each other. Either Steinbrück
manages to checkmate Merkiavelli through his approach to Europe or Merkiavelli
wins because she discovers the power-strategic significance of the European
idea and converts to being the founder of the United States of Europe.

In any case: Germany is facing the question of the existence or
non-existence of Europe. Germany has become simply too powerful to be able to
have the luxury of not deciding.

----





Parts of this
essay are taken from Beck’s most recent book Das deutsche Europa [19] (Suhrkamp 2012). The English translation (German Europe [19]; trans Rodney Livingstone) is forthcoming in 2013. A similar essay was
published in German in Der Spiegel (41/2012).










[1] Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince,
trans. Luigi Ricci, New York: Mentor 1952 [1935]: 98.
Country or region: 
Germany
EU
Topics: 
Civil society
Conflict
Democracy and government
Economics
Equality
Ideas
International politics









About the author
Ulrich
Beck is Professor of Sociology at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich,
Germany. Since 1997 he is British Journal of Sociology Visiting Centennial
Professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), UK and
since 2011 he is also Professor at the Fondation Maison des Sciences de
l’Homme
, Paris, France.

His
recent books include Cosmopolitan Europe [21] (together with Edgar Grande)
(Polity Press 2007), World at Risk [22](Polity Press 2009), A God of
One’s Own
[23]
(Polity Press 2010), Twenty Observations on a World in Turmoil [24]
(Polity Press 2012), Distant Love (together with Elisabeth
Beck-Gernsheim) (Polity Press 2013) and German Europe [25] (Polity Press
2013).
______________________________



    • damian_hockney
      Given her position, Angela Merkel is probably making the best of a bad job and trying to do the impossible of squaring the circle of the euro in its attempts to create a one-size-fits-all economy for the EU. But I see her more as a tightrope walker with a real need to play this game of reconciling irreconcilables well, mostly at home or with the EU political class. She is wobbling tight lipped along high wires knowing that her fall into one pit or another will be fatal for her and her party. And of course if what emerges is an even more centralised EU totally dominated in all ways by Germany with sad and collapsed subject economies and societies all around it, that would be no victory or legacy. Just look at the posters in Greece of Merkel as Hitler and the dramatic ill feeling and slogans about Germany on walls in the subject countries. The 400 million people in the rest of the EU might be the undoing of Merkiavelli.
    • Mark Warren

      The writer blows his
      argument in the last paragraph. The real intent of the article is not
      to make Merkel look bad but to make Germany look bad. To feed the
      British hatred of the Germans. If his intention was honest he would
      have said something positive about Steinbrück, who wants to control
      the banks, but he smeared Steinbrück as he smeared Merkel. Believe
      me dear reader, this writer would attack Steinbrück even more if he
      was chancellor. Instead of comparing Merkel with Machiavelli, he
      would have compared Steinbrück with Hitler. These are low cheap
      arguments anyway, even though the writer is a professor! I can assure
      you that the views of this writer are not held by all Germans. The
      Germans are intelligent enough to know that the problems impacting
      the EU are as much external as they are internal. Professor Beck, if
      you you want to find the real Machiavellian conspiracy, look to the
      City of London and New York's Wall street. It may be some consolation
      to know that Frau Merkel was a quantum physicist. That is, she
      understood that a photo could be measured as a particle or as a wave
      function. On Fridays, Saturdays Sundays and Mondays its a particle,
      on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays its a wave. It makes perfect
      sense.
    • Neil
      You've lost me I'm afraid - in what way does Beck 'smear' Steinbruck? In fact, in what way does he smear Merkel? - I rather see it as an accurate objective analysis of Merkel's realpolitik - its differences and similarities to the master's advice to the Prince. One might find it distatesful in some ways and agree with Beck that although Merkel's political strategy at home and abroad might be working very successfully (at the moment) her economic one doesn't seem to be - and that might prove the former's undoing - but this is hardly a smear.
      It's certainly true that all - most - German's don't share Beck's analysis but his analysis suggests why that is the case (i.e. a combination of national self-interest, national cultural resonances, and possibly 'shock and awe' at the brutal application of German power to subject countries). Popularity or its opposite however is never proof of the validity of an analysis. In addition, Beck's analysis in no way, in my opinion, precludes the possibility that 'the problems impacting the EU are as much external as they are internal'.
      (Edited by author 1 week ago)
    • Mark Warren

      I am myself not a believer
      in Merkels Sparpaket either applied in Germany or on other countries.
      But the “brutal application of German power” that you refer to is
      not something that the Germans wanted. Germany would much prefer that
      the other European countries were stronger. That she has become the
      glue that holds Europe together is her sckicksal; destiny. It was
      always going to be so. Ever since the end of the 19th
      century the British saw a united budding Germany with its economic
      and industrial power as a real threat to European dominance. Even
      after two world wars Germany is back. As the old saying goes, you
      can't keep a good guy down. Of course the British empire is long gone
      so we have nothing to worry about losing, but it lives on in spirit
      in newspapers such as the Telegraph and in websites such as this –
      for those who do. It's interesting that you use the term “shock and
      awe” a term coined by the Pentagon for their destruction of Third
      World countries. That you apply it here is more than inappropriate.
      You know its popular to slag Germany, it is after all a British
      pastime, and the British are good at it as they have lots of
      experience, one could argue it has become an art form, and some of
      the criticism is justified, try driving along the A60 from Mainz nach
      Rüsselsheim in the rush hour. And of course Merkel is out of her
      depth. But then so are most politicians. I don't see any articles
      criticising David Cameron. What we have here is a failure of the
      capitalist system that we thought unshakable. The Banks and Financial
      institutions have hollowed out our industry, and our politicians pay
      them lip service. We don't produce anything any more, we just move
      money around. The City of London has placed its faith on a fiat
      currency OF a fiat currency, the Euro Dollar.
      What angered me about
      Professor Beck's article is that he knows very well that there is a
      lot going on in Germany but it didn't get a mention. He chose to
      ignore it. Well that's his prerogative but pandering to British
      prejudice, sorry, not on my watch.
    • Neil
      Now you appear to criticise me unfairly too Mark! For some reason you seem to interpret comparisons of Merkel's strategic behaviour to Machiavellian power politics by anyone - both Beck and me - as traducing the German people as a whole and a demonstration of anti-German prejudice. Of course in some cases there might be prejudice but it's not logically correct to judge an argument by the attitudes of some of those who use it. I'm one of the last persons that can be accused of having conventional British prejudices towards Germany, and why should Beck be labelled as pro-Anglo Saxon, anti-German?  
      This article is not about British attitudes towards Germany, or British economic weakness and political failings; nor is it specifically about alternative political views in Germany - although when Beck does talk about internal opposition emerging and specifically mentions Steinbruck, for some reason, you veer from saying that Beck is smearing him to ignoring that he mentions it.  
      I believe you when you say the 'brutal application of German power' is "not something that the Germans wanted", if by that you mean the ordinary German citizen. However, I would not agree with this statement for the German elites in general  - and that is not an anti-German statement.  It is the universal almost invariable nature of elites, especially those operating within state systems to want to increase their power and use the state at home and abroad to do so.  It is also in the nature of most ordinary citizens, most of the time, to want their state to pursue policies in their national self-interest. Therefore when you argue "Germany would much prefer that the other European countries were stronger" I take that with a pinch of salt - by pursuing its self-interest Germany to some extent has reinforced that weakness in peripheral EU countries and - both elites and people - benefited from it (just as the British benefited from empire and its elites most of all, and in the process destroyed indigenous socio-economic systems).
      Although using the term 'shock and awe' to describe the exercise of German power on the southern European countries, particularly Greece, may have been borrowed from recent American neo-conservative rhetoric, that does not make a me a trans-Atlantic neo-con. The American's might have coined the term, however Machiavelli was the one who invented the theory. Merkel is merely showing herself as one of his more diligent pupils, even if in a larger, longer and more moral perspective, I agree with you that 'she is out of her depth'. Beck suggests, and I think he is correct - although this is just my speculation - that current German foreign policy towards the subject countries has the effect of increasing Merkel's popular support and stifling opposition.  It is the same political mechanism at work as public executions performed par excellence in the past. Of course because of the nature of the human conscience that requires a great deal of work at rationalising why the criminal deserved to be executed.
    • NorbertR
        After all the gloomy articles about the self-inflicted European debt crisis it was a welcome change to read something humorous.  Viele danke, professor. :-)
    • Mark Warren

      Well Neil, I think we can
      agree on one thing and that is conspiracies. By supporting Professor
      Beck's augment/thesis that Merkel is indeed Machiavellian, this is by
      definition a conspiracy. In its simplest form the conspiracy to
      advance Germany at the expense of other countries. You cannot use the
      term Machiavellian and then deny its implications, although the
      British are experts at this. But lets just say that you and Professor
      Beck are right and Merkel really is Machiavellian, she is a pretty
      bumbling Machiavellian? And started rather late in life. Did she ever
      read him? She reminds me of the lady in our local bakery. Now
      Margaret Thatcher, that's a different calibre, now she really did
      have meetings in dimly lit rooms and it wasn't to save electricity, a
      more worthy recipient of the term. Probably all “successful”
      politicians have an element of Machiavelli. And you are right about
      elites of all counties indulging the practice. Sorry to divert from
      the subject again but the British are by far the best in this. The
      British elite are the master Machiavellians. As to the advantages the
      British people got from their empire was that they could wear a
      uniform and defend it. Two master conspirators and extenders of the
      empire were of course Churchill and Montagu Norman. Machiavelli
      himself sided with Rome against Venice which shows that he wasn't as
      bad as his reputation. The Venetians themselves being master
      conspirators, very similar to the British. Sorry to have diverted
      from the subject but I found it rather claustrophobic.
    • cantloginas_Momo

      Mark, I don’t believe you will deny that Germany’s industry is extremely export-orientated, and that it is less dependent on other eurozone countries for a market than most (I believe: all) other Eurozone countries. A large portion of Germany’s exports goes to the world market, not the European one. (I use “Germany” as a term for the macro-economy here.) In the beginning the Euro was a disadvantage for Germany, and the (red/green) government reacted by introducing the Hartz reforms (lowering wages considerably). I believe so far we agree, don’t we?

      As a result the German macroeconomy is extremely vulnerable if the world economy beyond Europe is in crisis (as we have seen in 2008/09 with a sharp recession), but the markets in Europe are less important. If the Greeks buy Mercedes or starve has little implications for the German industry, short-term that is.

      This allows Merkel to play the nationalist card towards the countries of the periphery, and she is doing that shamelessly.
      There is no European solidarity, not even awareness that long term the German economy can only thrive with healthy economies in the periphery. What’s worse, this policy is popular!

      I don’t understand your criticism of the article. She is thinking of nothing but re-election and she is not the naive you paint her, far from it.
      (Edited by author 5 days ago)
    • Mark Warren
      Hi Momo: sorry for causing
      so much trouble, you are correct in what you say. I am not a Merkel
      fan, the sooner she's gone the better. My point is simply this. Obama
      has won four more years and the psycho Romney is gone. Even better,
      the Israeli Lobby has taken a battering. But even with Petraeus gone,
      Obama will continue with his drone slaughter. The slaughter in Syria
      will continue, supported by the UK, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the US.
      Its an attempt to turn it into the same mess that Libya is in with
      brutal armed gangs roaming the streets. Check out the videos on Press
      TV, no wonder they closed it down. Truly shocking. After Syria falls
      another innocent country Iran will be next. The EU is a shambles, and
      (your point) Germany is showing no leadership. The banksters are
      still giving themselves bonuses. The US and UK are both bankrupt as
      is most of Europe. Bankrupt not only financially but morally,
      politically and intellectually. Iran by the way, has a higher
      percentage electoral turnout than the US. One half of US citizens no
      longer vote. And what do I read? Merkel's Machiavellian tendencies. I
      know, I should have kept my big mouth shut. Next time I will. Scouts
      honour.
       
    • cantloginas_Momo
      Mark, you know that I agree with you on the current and future wars for oil, and I hope Germany stays out of them.  The Euro crisis is largely a German product, though. Merkel is leading, but it’s in the wrong direction.
      And do keep your mouth open.
    • Neil
      I second Momo - do keep your mouth open Mark! You are entitled to express your views as much as anyone else and personally I would like to hear them. 
      I agree with almost everything you said about Britain and the Middle East by the way, but my disagreements lay with you shifting the focus away from the subject of the article and some of the things that you said about Germany and Merkel.  
      Incidentally I had to smile at the image you portrayed of Merkel as a bumbling woman that reminds you of the 'lady at your local bakery'. I have a German friend, a Schwabian frau (and a Green) strangely enough, who says the same sort of thing. I wouldn't claim that Merkel's public persona is a complete act but I'm pretty sure her image, rhetoric and ideology is also calculated to tap into folk associations to bolster her appeal. As no doubt you know though appearances can often be deeply deceptive. 
      One thing I find very interesting talking with my German friend - and maybe you would like to comment - is how she views German/EU policy towards the Southern countries through the lens of recent German history i.e. the aftermath of German reunification and the Hartz reforms, and talks about how ordinary German people had to make sacrifices and undergo relative economic hardship while the economy was restructured, after which they could reap the benefits.  Of course there is a lot missing from, or different about, this comparison - not least the impact of the euro and the nature of the EU more generally - however if it is true that this analogy is widely prevalent in popular opinion it probably explains a lot I think.
    • Mark Warren

      Thanks for the comments
      from both. Well as you probably gather, I like the Germans. I moved
      to Germany during the Thatcher rule, 83. Thatcher was not the main
      reason but certainly a contributing factor. As to Neil's question.
      Germany has changed massively since I moved here. It's still finding
      its way politically. To understand Germany you really have to go back
      to Bismark (who was Machiavellian), its okay I'll keep this short,
      and the first stirrings of a complete Germany, an empire, (officially
      before but lets say 1900), its formation in “blood and iron”.
      This was seen by the British as a threat. Germany’s unification
      under Prussia came too late. The British were not going to allow the
      Berlin to Baghdad railway and horror of horrors a Bündnis (link)
      with Russia. Cutting a long story short after two world wars the
      Germans had their dreams of empire kicked out of them.
      Today Germany has arguably
      the richest political spectrum in Europe. It has a Green Party with
      political muscle, it has a left party (Die Linke) with muscle, plus
      the traditional parties (SPD, CDU, FDP), that one would find in other
      countries. And yet its still behaving like a prick at a wedding. Die
      Linke of course has been marginalised; perhaps Momo can answer that
      question better.
      When I moved here, Germany
      was beginning to enjoy the fruits of its Wirtschaftswunder, the two
      holiday per year was already established. Now if I understand Neil's
      question correctly, we have three phases or sacrifices, the first and
      biggest was after 1945, the second after the fall of the wall in
      1989, and thirdly the EU bailout. For the Germans the first sacrifice
      was the hardest the DM had to be backed with industrial muscle, while
      the integration of East Germany meant that money normally invested in
      old Bundesländer went instead to the former East Germany. The third
      bailout seems to be happening in a virtual world. Huge sums of money
      are being shuffled around but no one is feeling any immediate impact.
      Economics now takes place in a parallel universe. Of course the
      Greeks are suffering in the real world. Greece of course should never
      have been allowed in but we can thank our American friends at Goldman
      Sacks who rigged the books.
      One of the criticisms of
      the Europe (not including the UK), is that it is not taking a
      political lead. Well the problem is that Germany, its strongest
      member, has learnt from bitter experience to keep its head down. You
      cannot kick the shit out of someone and then expect them to be a
      leader.
    • cantloginas_Momo
      Oddly enough belief in interplanetary trade is almost uncontroversial in Germany: Neil reminds us that his friend from the Greens believes in it too, or how else have we to interpret her position? It’s: Lower wages and cut down social security and you will become competitive. This narrative doesn’t say who is meant to buy. Every country can have a trade surplus, apparently. I despair. If Mark’s scenario comes true and a major war in the Middle East kills the world economy, I’d be interested to know how she will
      react to the inevitable recession. Will she notice that the alternative to competition is cooperation?

      The trouble is that sound economics is counterintuitive, while Merkel’s narrative of the Swabian housewife is so easy. Even social-democrats and Greens who understand economics and who want to stop this neoliberal madness say one must be mad to try and campaign against the
      Swabian housewife meme. (I don’t sort Steinbrück into that category, by the way.) It’s not a sign for a truly rich political spectrum, is it Mark?

      In the meantime the south is forced (by Merkel!) to undergo “the relative economic hardship” of more than 25% unemployment. People die of treatable illnesses, because the Troika, especially Merkel, demand weak health care systems are butchered even more.

      As to Die Linke: they advocate ordoliberalism. You ought to read Sahra Wagenknecht. Nothing radical, one should think. But then the economic knowledge to know the difference between ordoliberalism and a centrally planned economy seems to have been lost…  The other parties marginalise them all right, Mark (Although to be fair, Die Linke always finds methods to marginalise itself, too. They don’t even need help for that.).

      And now Mark, do you really insist on wishing to hear some kind words about Merkel and the vice-chancellor candidate?
      (Edited by author 2 days ago)
    • cantloginas_Momo

      PS I’ll go on to rant like that until Merkel’s
      skin is delivered to Greece to be nailed as decoration on their parliament’s
      wall or so. And Jens Weidmann’s head on a pike could go to Portugal. Steinbrück
      can go as ambassador to Ouagadougou. "Merkiavelli" is too polite a word.
    • Neil
      Ah it's good to see a bit of passion on OD for a change - a sense of real politics rather than that of the university debating society. 
      It's interesting to read what both you and Mark have to say (if you don't mind me asking how do you come to be so knowledgeable about German politics and society?  I seem to recall some references somewhere which I thought placed you in the USA?).
      I sense that you also have serious concerns about the consequences of global free trade and maybe globalisation more generally, and might therefore sympathise with something like the idea of smaller, more self-contained and participatory democratic economic and political units co-operating rather than competing with each other?
      I think there is a huge blind spot in German society, across the political spectrum, about the nature and (external) consequences of German economic power. One of the apparent anomalies I see in my friend's views is the acute contrast between her understanding of the many detrimental consequences of expanding commercialism at home on the one hand, and of the consequences of German manufacturing might and foreign trade abroad. For instance, at home she is passionately opposed to the nexus of large-scale food producers and large supermarket corporations because of their wider consequences. Popular awareness of these sorts of issues seems to me far  more developed and progressive than in the UK, and the German political and economic systems seem to be partly designed to limit increased concentration of domestic economic power. Similarly at home I think the social democratic welfare state is taken as a given, even if phases of relative sacrifice and hardship are accepted as necessary for future success. I sense no popular preparedness to sacrifice the welfare state piece by piece for alleged economic imperatives as in the UK. As for what happens to welfare systems in the South because of the eurozone crisis and EU policy, there seems to be little or no domestic political understanding or interest (even if there is human sympathy).
      So I agree that sound economic (and political) understanding is often counterintuitive.  It relates I think to my speculation that the EU crisis is being interpreted by most of the German public through a sort of folk worldview grounded in the German common man's lived and remembered experience. This worldview is manipulated I think by the ruling elites for their own and national advantage. British neo-liberalism did exactly the same of course though, as it turns out, far less successfully. 
      Momo - I hope you're busy practising your animal skinning skills!
    • cantloginas_Momo
      You must have mixed me up with someone else, if you thought I was US American. I am German.
      “ the German political and economic systems seem to be partly designed to limit increased concentration of domestic economic power.”
      You are seeing the remnants of ordoliberalism. “Not the abuse of economic power must be fought, but economic power itself.” Quoth Walter Eucken, right-wing demi-god, and one of the founders of social market economy. And have you ever heard of “social partnership”? The term means the cooperation between employers and trade unions and was used for anti-communism. The tradition still prevents confrontativeness that is too open. The trade unions in many large corporations managed to maintain fairly high standards for a (dwindling) core staff, but they had to agree to temporary work for an (increasing) portion of the employed. In short, they agreed to a split of the working class that in the meantime has cost them the capability to strike.
      You are right, most Germans don’t understand that the race to the bottom (Hartz “reforms” in Germany, then “rescue packages” (grr) dismantling welfare in the south) has only started. They don’t understand either that the old models of participation in the fruits of increased productivity no longer exist.
      “I sense that you also have serious concerns about the consequences of global free trade and maybe globalisation more generally, and might therefore sympathise with something like the idea of smaller, more self-contained and participatory democratic economic and political units co-operating rather than competing with each other?”
      You sense perfectly right! This is what the EU can enable: we need strong small units, and we need a large European wide unit, too, but I don’t see what we will need nation-states for. It's horrible to see this nationalism that Merkel & Co. generate. 
    • Mark Warren

      Sorry had to leave for a
      while. All I know Momo is that I always feel depressed after reading
      your posts! Du lass kein gutes Haar an jemandem lassen. Momo the
      terminator. But I have to agree with you. One thing though, the
      German left is like King Lear: more sinned against than sinning. If
      you don't give someone a chance to play the ball, how can they prove
      themselves. To be honest I have not read what Sahra Wagenenknecht has
      written, and anyway, she's keeping Oskar warm in bed. Sorry for the
      flippant response. It's late.
    • cantloginas_Momo
      I am very sorry that you feel depressed by my posts, Mark. I feel depressed by the political situation.
      To answer you flippant remarks re Sahra Wagenknecht in the same spirit: there are some compelling arguments against men’s vote. Sahra is more articulate than you may have noticed. She writes books, which are worth reading. She is a member of the German Bundestag and her speeches are worth listening to. And she sleeps with Oskar. The latter has no political implications that I am aware of, but is mentioned more often than her view on the debt brake. Small wonder that the political situation is so depressing.
    • Neil
      I am sorry if you took my personal question as an unintended slur on your character Momo! I don't know where I got that idea from. 
      A federation of relatively small, autonomous, hyper-democratic and internally less socially unequal Lander across Europe co-operating with each other would be fantastic.  Who amongst our politicians and leading intellectuals though has any capacity for utopian thinking left in this dying and increasingly unfree world?
      (Edited by author 1 day ago)
    • cantloginas_Momo

      Help! I didn’t get that idea, and you have
      absolutely no need to apologise for anything.
    • cantloginas_Momo
      Yes, it is a nice image that you describe there.

      I think we are going the way of strengthening
      both the regional (in the EU sense) level and the EU. The globalisation has irrevocably damaged the nation state (that is no longer congruent with the macro-economy), so the nation-state will disappear. Hyper-democratic and without social inequality: this will have to be fought for. The powers that be are busy trying to make sure that these two don’t happen.
    • Mark Warren

      Momo. Yes; I have heard
      her speak on talk shows to which she is frequently invited. Firstly
      because she is very intelligent and secondly rather attractive. The
      only danger for those who host her, is that she can make the other
      guests look rather stupid. But now you are supporting my argument
      that the left in Germany is ignored. And when not ignored treated
      little different from the NPD. And this has nothing to do with the
      way they behave. Remember the directive to “watch” members of Die
      Linke like members of the NPD! Truely disgraceful. But then the media
      in Germany is likewise disgrceful. I thought it bad when they refered
      to Lafontaine as a “silverback” when the relationship came out.

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